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NOTES
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE TAXATION OF
INTANGIBLES
Two decisions handed down by the Supreme Court during the
current term, viz., Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia" and
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota,2 undoubtedly mark a
distinct variation in the law relating to the taxation of intangible
property. While the decision of each case on the points involved
is clear, there is considerable doubt as to what the effect of the two
cases will be, since they leave room, as will be seen, for a variety
of inquiries relating to the general principles of taxation. Under
the Virginia case intangible trust property located in another
state may not be taxed as such by the domiciliary state of the
beneficiaries; and under the Minnesota case intangible property
having a taxable situs in one state by virtue of the application
of the maxim mobilia, sequuntur personam, since it may be taxed
at the owner's domicile, is immune from taxation by the state in
which a debtor resides or the evidence of indebtedness is located.
From this summary of the two cases it can be seen that the court
has deliberately taken a stand against double taxation. The
same attitude was expressed in the case of Frick v. Pennsyl-
vania, decided five years ago, in regard to tangible property,3
and in several cases since ; 4 and while these cases are by no
means analogous to each other or to the cases under considera-
tion, it is impossible not to interpret the result in each case as
indicating a decided reluctance to sustain an exercise by the
states of the taxing power where it operates to tax the owner,
as in the case of property taxation, or the legatee, as in the case
of inheritance taxation, a second time.
While a different opinion has been expressed on the subject,G
(1929) 50 S. Ct. 59, 74 L. Ed. (Adv.) 76.
(1929) 50 S. Ct. 98, 74 L. Ed. (Adv.) 190.
(1925) 268 U. S. 473, in which a transfer tax on tangible personalty lo-
cated in another state was declared void.
'Brooke v. Norfolk (1928) 277 U. S. 27, holding that a beneficiary entitled
only to the income for life of a fund controlled and possessed by trustees in
another state where the trust was created, is not subject to a tax measured
by the value of the whole corpus, in addition to a tax measured by his in-
come. Also Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton (1926) 272 U. S. 567,
in which the donee of a power of appointment in regard to trust property
created and located in Massachusetts resided in North Carolina and exer-
cised the power there. North Carolina sought to levy a transfer tax com-
puted on the value of the whole trust estate which passed under the power
of appointment, and the tax was declared unconstitutional.
'See concurring opinion of McKenna, J., in Wheeler v. Sohmer (1913)
233 U. S. 434, in which he quotes with approval the language of the court
in Buck v. Beach (1907) 206 U. S. 392, to the effect that a property tax is
of a different nature from an inheritance tax and that decisions involving
one are not in point in regard to a case involving the other.
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it may now be stated as a general proposition that where a state
has no jurisdiction to levy a direct property tax, it likewise has
no jurisdiction to levy an inheritance or succession tax; and it
follows that cases involving either kind of tax may be cited in
connection with the other.6 Therefore, in discussing these tvo
cases, it will be necessary to refer to decisions concerning both
property and inheritance taxes, since a glance at either opinion
will show that the court has followed the view announced in
Rhode Island Trust Co. v. Doughton.
Taking up as a preliminary matter the maxim of the common
law, mobilia sequuntur personam, i. e., "movables follow the per-
son," which is constantly referred to on questions of situs for
purposes of taxation, it is found that this expression is merely a
legal fiction and is very apt to be misleading in view of the
kaleidoscopic treatment it has received at the hands of the
courts.7 It is not of universal application and does not rest on
any constitutional foundation. It is generally laid down that
the doctrine expressed by the maxim is one resting solely on con-
venience and justice, so that in a proper situation it yields to
the established facts.0 Thus where tangible personal property
has acquired an actual situs outside the state in which the owner
is domiciled,10 or where intangible personalty has acquired a busi-
ness situs in a state other than the one where the owner is domi-
ciled,11 the courts have found little difficulty in disregarding the
Rhode Island Trust Co. v. Doughton (1925) 270 U. S. 69, in which the
court said: ". . . the principle that the subject to be taxed must be within
the jurisdiction of the state applies as well in the case of a transfer tax as
in that of a property tax. A state has no power to tax the devolution of the
property of a nonresident unless it has jurisdiction of the property devolved
or transferred. In the matter of intangibles, like choses in action, shares of
stock and bonds, the situs of which is with the owner, a transfer tax of
course may properly be levied by the state in which he resides." Compare
Kroeger, Constitutional Limitations of State Jurisdiction Over Property for
Succession Tax Purposes (1929) 14 ST. Louis L. REV. 99.
""This rule is subject to so many exceptions and limitations that it is quite
as liable to mislead as to furnish a correct guide, when considered alone."
Board of Com'rs. Kingman County v. Leonard (1896) 57 Kan. 531, 46 Pac.
960, 34 L. R. A. 810.
' Cooley, TAXATioN (4th ed. 1924) sec. 440; State v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. (1920) 147 Minn. 339, 180 N. W. 108; Pullman Car Co. v. Penn-
sylvania (1890) 141 U. S. 18; State Board of Assessors v. Comptoir Na-
tional d'Escompte (1903) 191 U. S. 388; Buck v. Beach (1907) 206 U. S.
392.
1Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans (1906) 205 U. S. 395; Frick
v. Pennsylvania (1925) 268 U. S. 473, 42 A. L. R. 316; New Orleans v.
Stemple (1899) 175 U. S. 309.
Union Refrig. Transit Co.*v. Kentucky (1905) 199 U. S. 194.
Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Orleans Assessors (1910) 221 U. S. 346; New Or-
leans v. Stemple, note 9 above.
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maxim and refusing its application, in cases involving either
property tax or inheritance tax.12 It is interesting to note in this
connection that in Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota the
maxim was applied and the tax denied, and that in Safe Deposit
& Trust Co. v. Virginia the court expressly refused to apply the
maxim to the situation and the tax was likewise denied. The
former involved, as will be seen, an inheritance tax, while the
latter concerned a property tax. As was said in the Virginia
case, quoting with approval an earlier decision of the court,1 3
".. . the maxim was intended for convenience, and not to be
controlling where justice does not demand it."
The case of Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia involved a
property tax assessed against the non-resident trustee domiciled
in Maryland and levied on stocks and bonds held in that state.
The beneficiaries, two minor children of the settlor, were residents
of Virginia, but received neither the income nor any part of the
corpus. Under the terms of the trust agreement each bene-
ficiary was to receive one-half of the accumulated income and one-
half of the corpus on reaching the age of 25. The settlor re-
served a power of revocation which had not been exercised. The
trustee was taxed by the State of Maryland for the entire trust
estate, and the whole corpus was again taxed by Virginia. This
tax was sustained by the special Court of Appeals. On appeal
to the Supreme Court the decision was reversed and the tax de-
clared unconstitutional.
Mr. Justice McReynolds, in the majority opinion, bases the
decision on the fact that the trustee had complete legal title to the
securities in another state, and no person in Virginia had a
present right to their enjoyment or power to remove. There-
fore, the court says, the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam
must be disregarded and must yield to the established fact of
legal ownership. In discussing the main point, the court says:
"Here we must decide whether intangibles-stocks, bonds-in
the hands of the holders of the legal title with definite taxable
situs at its residence, not subject to change by the equitable14
" Wheeler v. Sohmer (1913) 233 U. S. 434; Frick v. Pennsylvania, note 9
above. ". . . the old rule expressed in the maxim mobilia sequuntur per-
sonam, by which personal property was regarded as subject to the law of
the owner's domicile, grew up in the Middle Ages, when movable property
consisted chiefly of gold and jewels, which could easily be carried by the
owner from place to place, or secreted in spots known only to himself. In
modern times, since the great increase in amount and variety of personal
property, not immediately connected with the person of the owner, that rule
has yielded more and more to the lex situs, the law of the place where the
property is kept and used." Pullman Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, note 8 above.
I State Board of Assessors v. Comptoir National d'Escompte (1903) 191
U. S. 388. 14 Italics the writer's.
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owner, may be taxed at the latter's domicile in another state.
We think not. The reasons which led this court in Union Refrig.
Transit Co. 'v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 50 L. ed. 150, and Frick
v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 69 L. ed. 1058, 42 A. L. R. 316,
to deny application of the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam to
tangibles apply to the intangibles in appellant's possession.
They have acquired a situs separate from that of the beneficial
owners. The adoption of a contrary rule would involve possi-
bilities of an extremely serious character by permitting double
taxation, both unjust and oppressive." Justices Stone and
Brandeis, although upholding Virginia's right to tax the interest
of the beneficiaries, 15 which was not done, concur on the ground
that the taxation of securities under the exclusive control of a
trustee in another state is taxation of property without jurisdic-
tion. Mr. Justice Holmes dissented on two grounds, first, that
under the deed of trust the beneficiaries were the absolute owners,
and second, that exemption from taxation of property which
has acquired an extra-state situs should be limited in all cases
to tangibles, and should not be extended to intangibles.
It would seem from the statement of the case and from Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes' dissent, that the important and controlling point
which was practically ignored in the opinion, was whether under
the deed of trust the beneficiaries could be deemed "owners" for
purposes of taxation. Since the tax was assessed against the
trustee it can be said that the question does not arise. But Mr.
Justice Holmes says very emphatically in discussing the right of
Virginia to tax the beneficiaries on the whole corpus: "I do not
understand that any merely technical question is raised on the
naming of the trustee instead of the cestui que trust as the party
taxed."16 This language suggests that it is the beneficiaries in
fact who are being taxed, and hence that the question whether
they are the owners or not, is a decisive one. But the majority
opinion passes this question up,' 7 and decides the case on the fact
of legal ownership.
To one not familiar with the opinion and with the group of
cases cited therein, it is perhaps confusing just how far the
" See Maguire v. Trefry (1920) 253 U. S. 12, note 18 infra.
"See Selden v. Brooke (1906) 104 Va. 832, 52 S. E. 632, in which it is
said: "Though the tax is assessed in the name of the trustee, the burden is
in reality imposed upon the beneficial owner, a resident of the common-
wealth, who enjoys the protection of its laws along with other citizens, and
ought in fairness, to contribute her due proportion of revenue for the sup-
part of the government."
"We need not make any nice inquiry concerning the ultimate or equi-
table ownership of the, securities or the exact nature of the interest held by
the sons. In the disclosed circumstances, we think that is not a matter of
controlling importance." 50 S. Ct. at p. 60. 1
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opinion does go.'8 This doubt is augmented in the dissenting
opinion of Holmes, J., where, after noting the exception to the
rule regarding taxation of personalty in cases involving tangible
property permanently situated in another state,19 he says: "It
seemed to me going pretty far to discover even that limitation in
the 14th Amendment. It opens vistas to extend the restriction to
stocks and bonds in a way that I cannot reconcile with Blodgett
The point to bear in mind is that the earlier cases presented widely
varying phases of the problem, which the court had to decide as they came
up. Thus, in Kirtland v. Hotchkiss (1879) 100 U. S. 491, the issue was the
right of Connecticut to tax bonds owned by a resident, executed by a non-
resident. The tax was sustained under the view that the debt is regarded
as situated at the domicile of the creditor. No question was raised as to the
right of Illinois, the domicile of the debtor, to tax the bonds. In New Or-
leans v. Stemple (1899) 175 U. S. 309, the power of Louisiana to tax choses
in action on deposit in a Louisiana bank, where the owner was a resident of
New York, was challenged. The tax was sustained on the ground that the
notes and obligations had a "business situs" for purposes of taxation in
Louisiana. In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans (1907) 205 U. S.
395, a tax on the "credits, moneys loaned" etc., by the company, which did
business in Louisiana through an agent, was sustained even though the notes
were sent to and kept at New York, the main office of the company. The
court said: "Moreover, neither the fiction that personal property follows the
domicile of its owner, nor the doctrine that credits evidenced by bonds and
notes may have the situs of the latter, can be allowed to obscure the truth."
In Buck v. Beach (1907) 206 U. S. 392, notes made and payable in Ohio,
owned by a resident of New York, were located in Indiana. Indiana levied
a tax on the notes, and the tax was declared unconstitutional on the ground
that notes being mere evidences of debts, there was no taxable property
within the state, so that the mere presence of the notes gave no jurisdiction
to tax. In Wheeler v. Sohmer (1914) 233 U. S. 434, notes on deposit in a
New York bank, owned by an Illinois decedent, were held subject to an in-
heritance tax levied by New York. The effect of this decision was to de-
clare notes something more than "mere evidences of indebtedness," with a
taxable situs where situated, at least at that time, for succession tax pur-
poses. In Hawley v. Malden (1913) 232 U. S. 1, a tax on stock in foreign
corporations, owned by a resident, was upheld, even though it had acquired
a taxable situs in the state of incorporation. In Maguire v. Trefry (1920)
253 U. S. 12, Massachusetts taxed the income of a resident beneficiary, from
trust property under the control of a trustee resident in Pennsylvania. The
maxim was applied and the interest of the beneficiary as measured by the
income was held subject to taxation. The court said: "The case presents no
difference in principle from the taxation of credits evidenced by the obliga-
tions of persons who are outside of the state which are held taxable at the
domicile of the owner. Kirtland v. Hotchldss, 100 U. S. 491." In Blodgett
v. Silbermann (1927) 277 U. S. 1, Connecticut levied an inheritance tax on
bonds and choses in action owned by a resident decedent, which had an actual
situs in New York. The tax was sustained under the rule of mobilia
sequuntur personain.
' Union Refrig. Transit Co. v. Kentucky (1905) 199 U. S. 194.
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IV. Silbermnn, 277 U. S. 1, 72 L. ed. 749." But a study of the
opinions concerning the power of taxation, as in all cases involv-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment, 20 shows that the decision is
limited in its application strictly to the facts presented, and it
cannot be said that the decision is an extension of the principle
of the Frick case 2 1 to intangible property. The situs for taxation
of the intangible corpus when the cestui has full beneficial enjoy-
ment is still an open question.22
The other recent case referred to above is Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co. v. Minnesota.23 In that case Minnesota levied an in-
heritance tax on bonds and certificates of indebtedness issued by
the state of Minnesota and by cities in said state. The bonds
were located in a New York bank, in which city the decedent was
domiciled, and a transfer tax levied by the state of New York
had been paid. The court, speaking again through Mr. Justice
MclReynolds, held the tax unconstitutional as a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The opinion states first that the bonds under consideration
were rightfully regarded as ordinary choses in action, present-
ing a proper case for the application of the maxim mobilia
sequuntur personam, which would give them situs for taxation
in New York. The next step in the decision was expressly to
overrule the earlier decision in Blackstone v. Miller 25 which held
that choses in action were properly taxable at both the debtor's
and the creditor's domicile. The argument that the laws of Min-
nesota provided means for enforcing payment of the obligations
of Minnesota public corporations, so as to give the debts a situs
for taxation in that state, was dismissed as obsolete and untenable.
The court then cites the cases supporting the rule that the taxa-
tion by a state of property not within its jurisdiction is a viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment,20 and the limitations on the
Mr. Justice Moody in discussing the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment says: "This court has always declined to give a comprehensive
definition of it, and has preferred that its full meaning should be gradually
ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the de-
cisions of cases as they may arise." Twining v. New Jersey (1908) 211
U. S. 78.
' Frick v. Pennsylvania (1925) 268 U. S. 473, holding an inheritance tax
on tangibles situated in another state to be illegal.
' See note (1929) 42 HARv. L. REV. 712.
=(1929) 50 S. Ct. 98.
'Blodgett v. Silbermann (1927) 277 U. S. 1.
(1902) 188 U. S. 189, in which an inheritance tax on a bank deposit in
New York owned by an Illinois decedent was sustained. See article by
Kroeger, cited note 6 above.
'State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds (U. S. 1873) 15 Wall. 300; Union
Refrig. Transit Co. v. Kentucky (1905) 199 U. S. 194; Safe Deposit & Trust
Co. v. Virginia (1929) 280 U. S. 83; Rhode Island Trust Co. v. Doughton
(1925) 270 U. S. 69.
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taxation of tangibles having an extra-state situs where a prop-
erty tax is involved2- and where a transfer tax is involved.2
After referring to the doctrine under which tangibles are taxed
only by the state in which they are located, the court says:
"And, we think, the general reasons declared sufficient to inhibit
taxation of them [tangibles] by two states apply under present
circumstances with no less force to intangibles with taxable situs
imposed by due application of the legal fiction." And again, "We
have determined that in general intangibles may be properly
taxed at the domicile of their owner and we can find no sufficient
reason for saying that they are not entitled to enjoy an immunity
against taxation at more than one place similar to that accorded
to tangibles." Although restricted to the facts involved, it is
manifest that such a holding, if carried to its logical conclusion,
would overturn many of the prior decisions involving the tax-
ation of intangibles. For instance, under the decision of Wheeler
v. Sohmer 29 choses in action which were taxed under the maxim
by the state in which the decedent resided, were also held to have
a taxable situs in a second state solely by reason of their presence
in the second state. It is submitted that the court could just as
appropriately have overruled Wheeler v. Sohmer under the line
of reasoning applied in overruling Blackstone v. Miller, and have
relied on the earlier case of Buck v. Beach" at the same time.
Another question that is raised is the application of the rule an-
nounced in the opinion to the taxation by the state of the owner
of bonds which have acquired a taxable business situs in another
state." The court in this connection says: "The present record
gives no occasion for us to inquire whether such securities can
be taxed a second time at the owner's domicile."
It is interesting to note the assault against double taxation by
the court in overruling Blackstone v. Miller. "The inevitable
tendency of that view [i. e., the rule of Blackstone v. Miller and
approving decisions] is to disturb good relations among the
states and produce the kind of discontent expected to subside
after establishment of the union. . The practical effect of
it has been bad; perhaps two-thirds of the states have endeav-
ored to avoid the evil by resort to reciprocal exemption laws."
This, however, is only dictum, and the decision in Frick v. Penn-
sylvania, holding inter alia that double taxation of intangibles
"Union Refrig. Transit Co. v. Kentucky, note 26 above.
Frick v. Pennsylvania, note 21 above.
(1913) 233 U. S. 434.
(1907) 206 U. S. 392, in which it was held that choses in action, owned
by a New York creditor, merely located in Indiana, had no taxable situs in
latter state.
" New Orleans v. Stemple (1899) 175 U. S. 309; Bristol v. Washington
County (1899) 177 U. S. 133; Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Board of As-
sessors (1910) 221 U. S. 346.
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for succession tax purposes is constitutionally unobjectionable,
is a word to the contrary. Nevertheless, the following language
also contained in the opinion is rather convincing: ". .. cer-
tainly, existing conditions no less imperatively32 demand pro-
tection of choses in action against multiplied taxation whether
following misapplication of some legal fiction or conflicting the-
ories concerning the sovereign's right to exact contributions.
For many years the trend of decisions has been in that di-
rection."
In connection with the action of the court in overruling
Blackstone v. Miller it is noteworthy that the attitude of the
court as far as the taxation of debts or choses in action is con-
cerned denotes a return to the view of the earlier state decisions
which held that for the purpose of an inheritance tax a chose in
action is to be regarded as situated with the creditor, so that a
debt due from a resident debtor to a nonresident decedent is not
taxable.3 3 Likewise, a bank deposit has been held a mere debt
due from the bank to depositor; as a mere chose in action it is
without actual situs. It may be taxed at the depositor's domi-
cile, and the state where the bank is located has refused to tax
it2 4 Professor Beale in criticizing the Blackstone case several
years ago35 said: ". .. by the great weight of authority it is
agreed that a debt has no territorial situs and can be taxed only
as part of the personal tax of the creditor. A creditor may be
taxed in the state of his domicile on all debts and choses in action
due to him; but the state of the debtor cannot tax a debt due to
a nonresident creditor." 3
WALLACE V. WILSON, JR., '30.
COMPLAINANT'S MISCONDUCT AS A DEFENSE TO HIS
ACTION FOR DIVORCE
So long as Roman Catholicism was the state religion of Eng-
land, that is, up to the reign of Henry VIII, marriage was re-
' That is, than tangibles having an extra-state situs.
'Allen v. Philadelphia Say. Fund Society (1879) 1 Fed. Cas. 234; Kint-
zing v. Hutchinson (1877) Fed. Cas. No. 7, 834; Gilbertson v. Oliver (1906)
129 Ia. 568, 105 N. W. 1002; Matter of Gordon (1906) 186 N. Y. 471, 79 N.
E. 722; Orcutt's Appeal (1881) 97 Pa. 179.
Pyle v. Brenneman (1903) 122 F. 787; State v. Clement Nat. Bank
(1911) 84 Vt. 167, 78 Atl. 944; Pendelton v. Com'th (1909) 110 Va. 229, 65
8. E. 536. The opposite view was taken in Matter of Houdayer (1896) 150
N. Y. 37, 44 N. E. 189, and again in Blackstone v. Miller (1903) 188 U. S.
189.
(1919) 32 HAuv. L. REV. 587 at 603.
Citing Jack v. Walker (1897) 79 1. 138; Collins v. Miller (1871) 43 Ga.
336; Foresman v. Byrns (1879) 68 Ind. 247; McCartney v. Gordon (1901)
127 Mich. 517, 86 N. W. 1042.
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